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[ Reply | Next | Previous | Up ] When group-think takes overFrom: By Gerald M. Steinberg (Jerusalem Post) Comments
When group-think takes over By Gerald M. Steinberg
(January 7) - In August 1993, when the late Yitzhak Rabin first presented the Oslo Declaration of Principles to the government, there was almost unanimous enthusiasm. The only dissent was voiced by Lt.-Gen. Ehud Barak, head of the IDF and Rabin's protege. Barak pointed to the holes in the agreement - in particular, the absence of a clear Israeli concept of permanent status and the potential for continued Palestinian support for terror. A few years later, Barak, who had left the IDF and become a minister, was the only cabinet member to withhold approval of the Cairo agreement. Barak, of course, turned out to be right. Is there anyone around to challenge Prime Minister Barak in negotiations with the Syrians? The political opposition is too weak and divided. To be effective, the questions must come from within the government or the professionals in the military/security establishment. More than ever, the Israel negotiating team seems to be characterized by group-think, which allows intelligent individuals to substitute agreement for analysis. When people of very similar backgrounds and experiences consider an issue together, they are subject to factors that work against rational decision making, and as a result, simplistic formulas replace complex reality. Information is filtered through distorted lenses, and data that contradict the prevailing conception (conceptzia in Hebrew) don't register. Analysts who raise alternative scenarios are dismissed as being motivated by ideological or political considerations. The term "conceptzia" entered the Israeli lexicon after the debacle of the Yom Kippur War. A few days earlier, most generals, politicians, and strategic analysts were so confident of their ability to predict the actions of Egypt and Syria that they dismissed all the signs of mobilization and preparations for attack. Of course, the military and political situation now is very different, but the problem of group-think remains. It is pervasive in the negotiations with Syria. For example, the dominant assumption is that after Assad and after a peace treaty, Syria will become a more open society, and the ideological hostility toward Israel will be replaced by the drive to modernize and make money. This is desirable, even logical, but there is no way to test its validity. Twenty years after the peace treaty with Egypt, the social and economic implications, if any, are still unclear. Similarly, the Israeli position in the Syrian negotiations depends on a very positive assessment of the future American-Israeli relationship. To compensate for the substantial security risks, the IDF expects to receive from the US a package of satellite and airborne early-warning systems, advanced conventional military technology, and accelerated missile defense research. Cost estimates range from $10 billion to $30b., and although Clinton is likely to agree, it must also be approved by Congress, which has not had a very positive approach to the president and his foreign policy. The type of cooperation being considered requires long-term American commitments, with budgets approved annually. Conflicting policies, priorities, or other factors could get in the way. But in an atmosphere of group-think, the alternative and less positive scenarios are apparently not being considered. According to press reports, Barak and the Defense Ministry are even willing to accept the modernizing of the Syrian army. The dangers are illustrated in the case of Egypt, and the US is reportedly promising to ensure Israeli superiority. But 25 years ago Henry Kissinger also pledged to maintain Israel's qualitative edge, in the context of withdrawal negotiations with Egypt. Yet, when presidents Carter and Reagan decided to sell AWACS and F-15 aircraft to Saudi Arabia, Israel suddenly realized they had different interpretations of the promise. This does not mean the US is unreliable, but should serve as an antidote to the enthusiasm engendered by group-think. In this environment, the public may have to play the role that Barak filled earlier in his career. When the negotiated agreement with Syria is presented for approval in a referendum, each of the prevailing assumptions will be dissected in detail. If Barak and his team do their job professionally and do not allow political or emotional factors to dominate, the people will endorse the draft. But no slogans, billboards, or public relations techniques will be able to mask fundamental defects in the proposed treaty. (The writer is the director of the Program on Conflict Resolution and Diplomacy at Bar-Ilan University.)
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